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Abstract
Abstractions of programs are traditionally over-approximations and have proved to be useful for the ver-
iﬁcation of safety properties. They are presently perceived as being useless for the falsiﬁcation of safety
properties, i.e. showing that program execution deﬁnitely reaches a “bad” state. Alternative techniques,
such as the computation of under-approximating must transitions, have addressed this shortcoming in the
past. We show that over-approximating models can indeed falsify safety properties by relying on and ex-
ploiting the seriality and partial determinism of programs: programs don’t just stop for no reason, and most
program statements have deterministic semantics. Our method is based on solving a two-person attractor
game derived from over-approximating models and makes no assumptions about the abstraction domain
used. An example demonstrates the successful use of our approach, and highlights the role played by seri-
ality and our handling of nondeterminism. Finally, we show that our method can encode must transitions,
if supplied, by a simple modiﬁcation of the ownership of nodes in the attractor game derived from the
over-approximating model.
Keywords: software veriﬁcation, games, falsiﬁcation
1 Introduction
For over thirty years, over-approximating models have been used for verifying safety
properties of programs. Intuitively an over-approximating model has all the be-
haviours of the original program, and possibly many more; this is expressed by
conditions such as trace-inclusion and simulation. Veriﬁcation of safety properties
is based on the following observation: because an over-approximating model has at
least all the behaviours of the original program, any “bad” behaviours (i.e. those
that violate the desired safety property) present in the program are also present in
the model. Therefore, if the model contains no bad behaviours, the program does
not either. Systems such as SLAM [1], BLAST [11] and our own system HECTOR
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[5] have been developed which automatically extract over-approximating models
from programs using abstraction.
However, the above scheme does not allow the falsiﬁcation of safety properties,
because bad behaviours found in the model need not be present in the original
program – they may be “artifacts” introduced by the over-approximation process,
and therefore “not feasible” in the original program. Approaches to the falsiﬁcation
of safety properties have focused on showing that abstract counterexamples are
indeed feasible, for example by:
(i) searching for a corresponding concrete counterexample (e.g. [15]),
(ii) proving the feasibility of the abstract counterexample path by satisﬁability
checking (e.g. [1]), or
(iii) adding under-approximation or calculation of “must-transitions” to the model
(e.g. [9,10]).
Here we present a method of falsifying safety properties which uses only over-
approximating models. In particular, our method doesn’t perform any of the tasks
(i), (ii), (iii) above. Instead, our method is based on playing a two-player game over
the transition graph of the over-approximating model, and exploits two properties of
programs: seriality (execution of a program does not just “stop” for no reason) and
what we call partial determinism. By this we mean that most program statements
are deterministic, so any nondeterminism in the program or its instrumentation is
conﬁned to a small number of identiﬁable locations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the notions of
programs, models and safety properties we use. Section 3 shows how to use two-
player games to falsify safety properties without performing any of the usual tasks
listed above. Section 4 presents an illuminating example of falsiﬁcation. Section 5
shows how our approach supports the easy incorporation of must information when
it is available. Section 6 concludes and discusses related work.
2 Background
Programs and their semantics.
We begin by setting out the kinds of programs, models and safety properties we
deal with in this paper. It will be seen that our setup is very general.
In this paper, we work with programs expressed as control ﬂow graphs (CFGs).
Figure 1 shows two simple such programs, drawn with unﬁlled nodes. Formally,
each control ﬂow graph is encoded by giving a set of locations Locs, which includes
an element start, and a function E : Locs → Edges mapping each location l to the
single (hyper)edge leaving it. The allowed forms of edges are:
• Conditional (hyper)edges: if(Φ) : l1 : l2 . These transfer control to location l1 if
the condition Φ holds, and to l2 otherwise.
• Edges for ordinary statements: f : l . These execute the statement f and transfer
control to location l.
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• Choice (hyper)edges: choice : l1 : l2 . These represent nondeterministic choice,
and (in a sense) transfer control to both l1 and to l2.
(Here Φ is a guard condition, and Φ ⊆ State denotes the set of states in which
Φ holds. In this paper we assume nothing about guard conditions Φ or −.)
To give semantics to our programs, we assume a set State of program states,
including an initial state sinit in which execution begins. We also assume that for
each ordinary statement f, an associated transfer function f : State → State is given.
Note that we work at a high level of abstraction, assuming nothing about the
nature of the state space State and the transfer functions f , so that for instance our
results apply equally to languages with heaps as to those without.
As is customary, we put a transition system semantics onto programs. A pro-
gram’s transition system has state space Locs× State, whose elements we call con-
ﬁgurations. The transition relation −→ ⊆ (Locs × State) × (Locs × State) is given
by the following (named) rules:
ord
E(l) = f : l′
(l, s) −→ (l′, f(s))
choice-1
E(l) = choice : l1 : l2
(l, s) −→ (l1, s)
choice-2
E(l) = choice : l1 : l2
(l, s) −→ (l2, s)
if-true
E(l) = if(Φ) : l1 : l2 s ∈ Φ
(l, s) −→ (l1, s)
if-false
E(l) = if(Φ) : l1 : l2 s /∈ Φ
(l, s) −→ (l2, s)
We say that a conﬁguration (l, s) is reachable if there exists a sequence (l1, s1) −→
· · · −→ (lk, sk) such that (l1, s1) = (start, sinit) and (lk, sk) = (l, s).
We stated in the introduction that our development will depend on seriality and
partial determinism, so we establish a lemma for these, which looks fairly innocuous
but will be crucial later.
Lemma 2.1 Seriality and partial determinism of −→. The concrete transition
relation −→ is
(i) serial, i.e. for all conﬁgurations (l, s), there exists a conﬁguration (l′, s′) such
that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′).
(ii) partially deterministic, i.e. for all conﬁgurations (l, s) with E(l) not of form
choice : l1 : l2 , if (l, s) −→ (l′, s′) and (l, s) −→ (l′′, s′′) then (l′, s′) = (l′′, s′′).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary conﬁguration (l, s). Then E(l) has three possible
forms:
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(i) E(l) = f : l1. For seriality, put (l′, s′) := (l1, f(s)) and the ord rule gives
(l, s) −→ (l′, s′). For partial determinism, simply note that no other rule is
applicable.
(ii) E(l) = if(Φ) : l1 : l2. Either s ∈ Φ or s /∈ Φ. If s ∈ Φ then for
seriality, put (l′, s′) := (l1, s) and the if-true rule gives (l, s) −→ (l′, s′); for
partial determinism note that no other rule is applicable. If s /∈ Φ then
for seriality, put (l′, s′) := (l2, s) and the if-false rule gives (l, s) −→ (l′, s′); for
partial determinism note that no other rule is applicable.
(iii) E(l) = choice : l1 : l2. For seriality, put (l′, s′) := (l1, s) and the choice-1 rule
gives (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). For partial determinism there is nothing to check.

Abstraction domains.
Our abstract models of programs will be built from abstraction domains. An
abstraction domain in this paper will consist of a set A of abstract values, and a
concretisation function γ : A → P(State) which gives meaning to the abstract values.
This very general formulation is all that is needed in this paper, and so our results
apply to arbitrary abstraction domains, though in practice an abstraction domain
comes with more components, such as abstract successor functions (see e.g. [14,7]).
Our development here also applies to the analysis modules presented in [4,3].
Model checking queries.
In this paper, we will consider a particular type of safety property: our queries
will be expressed by giving a set B ⊆ Locs × State of “bad” conﬁgurations, and
asking whether any of the bad conﬁgurations are reachable in the program. If no
b ∈ B is reachable, then the safety property represented by B is true (which we will
abbreviate to “B is true”). On the other hand if some b ∈ B is reachable, then the
safety property represented by B is false (which we will abbreviate to “B is false”).
We will not go into the issue of how one abstractly represents such a set B.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Abstract (over-approximating) models. An abstract model
M = (N, abs−−→) for a given program, and built using the abstraction domain (A, γ),
consists of a set N ⊆ Locs×A of abstract nodes, and an abstract transition relation
abs−−→ ⊆ N ×N , satisfying the following healthiness conditions:
H1 If (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′) then E(l) must be some edge with l′ as a target.
H2 If (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′) and E(l) is a choice edge, then a′ = a.
H1 ensures that transitions in the model only occur between locations that are
connected by CFG edges, so that the transition structure of the model falls into line
with the structure of the CFG. H2 ensures that choice edges are treated simply as
junctions, by not allowing the abstract value to change across a choice edge. (No
such restriction is made for conditionals because we want to allow abstract values
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Fig. 1. The unﬁlled nodes, and their associated transitions, show the control ﬂow graphs of two simple pro-
grams. The attached ﬁlled nodes, and their associated (green) transitions, depict sound default augmented
models for the programs, built using sign analysis. Our method establishes that both programs reach their
error states, unlike a conventional treatment of must transitions e.g. [9].
to become more precise across a conditional edge, as a result of incorporating the
information that the guard holds (respectively does not hold).) 
Figures 1 and 2 (page 10) are examples of such abstract models, drawn using the
ﬁlled nodes (ignoring the P/F annotations for now). These models are built using
a sign analysis, an abstraction domain which tracks only the sign of each variable,
i.e. whether it is negative, zero or positive, and discards all other information.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Soundness of abstract models. An abstract model M as above
is said to be sound if the following, standard simulation-type, condition holds:
S1 Let (l, a) ∈ N and (l, s) be such that s ∈ γ(a). Let (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). Then there
exists (l′, a′) ∈ N such that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′). 
It can be seen that the models in Figure 1 are sound. Veriﬁcation of safety
properties, in the standard way described in the introduction, can be performed on
the basis of S1; we will not dwell on this as we concentrate on falsiﬁcation here.
Lemma 2.4 Seriality of abs−−→. The abstract transition relation abs−−→ is serial in
sound models, in the sense that for all nodes n = (l, a) ∈ N , provided γ(a) is
nonempty there exists a node n′ such that n abs−−→ n′.
Proof. Let s ∈ γ(a). By Lemma 2.1 (seriality) there exists (l′, s′) such that (l, s) −→
(l′, s′). Applying S1 completes the proof. 
3 Our games on over-approximating models
We now show how to use two-player attractor games to falsify safety properties. The
intuition of what follows is that, given a safety property B, we are going to play a
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two-person game, where the positions are the nodes n ∈ N of an over-approximating
model.
We call the players F and P: player F is trying to Falsify (i.e. reach) B, and
player P is trying to Prevent this from happening. A play in this game consists
of a sequence of moves which generate a sequence of nodes. Plays may start at
any position n ∈ N . A move at position n in a play means choosing n′ such that
n
abs−−→ n′; node n′ becomes the new position of that play.
An extra function ρ determines which player is to move at each position. We
say that player F wins from position n if he can ensure that all plays beginning in
position n reach a position m = (l, a) where for all s ∈ γ(a), we have (l, s) ∈ B, i.e.
all concrete conﬁgurations represented by m are “bad”. In other words, player F
wins all those positions n from which he can force all plays into “bad” positions.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Augmented models An augmented model M+ = (N, abs−−→, ρ)
consists of an abstract model (N, abs−−→) along with a function ρ : N → {F, P}. 
Of course, we cannot just use any old partition of the nodes among the two
players. The following deﬁnition sets out what we require from such a partition.
(In A1 the quantiﬁer pattern is ∀∃, and in A2 it is ∃∃, which is reminiscent of the
relations R∀∃ and R∃∃ from [8]. In the proof of Theorem 3.3, A1 will give us exactly
what we need at F’s nodes, and A2 will give us just what we need at P’s nodes.)
Deﬁnition 3.2 Soundness of augmented models. An augmented model M+ =
(N, abs−−→, ρ) is said to be sound if (N, abs−−→) is sound and the following hold:
A1 Let ρ((l, a)) = F and s ∈ γ(a). Then for all (l′, a′) such that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′),
there exists s′ ∈ γ(a′) such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′).
A2 Let ρ((l, a)) = P and s ∈ γ(a). Then there exists (l′, a′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′) such
that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′) and (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). 
The models in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (page 10) are sound augmented models,
with the ρ function depicted with P/F annotations at each abstract node.
To perform falsiﬁcation from a node n, we demonstrate that player F wins the
attractor game (as described above) from that node. To that end we use a judgement
Hn which means that the abstract node (or game position) n ∈ N is “Hopeless”
with respect to the set B of bad conﬁgurations, i.e. that once execution reaches n
there is no hope for avoiding forever the set of bad conﬁgurations B. In terms of
the attractor game, the intent of this judgement is to express that player F wins
position n. The named derivation rules for this judgement are as follows.
h-all-bad
{(l, s) | s ∈ γ(a)} ⊆ B
H(l, a)
h-P-move
ρ(n) = P ∀n′ ∈ N, if n abs−−→ n′ then Hn′
Hn
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h-F-move
ρ(n) = F ∃n′ ∈ N such that n abs−−→ n′ and Hn′
Hn
The following theorem shows that what we are calling “hopeless” nodes really do
inevitably lead to a bad conﬁguration. Its subsequent corollary justiﬁes falsiﬁcation
using sound augmented models and the judgement H.
Theorem 3.3 Let M+ be a sound augmented model, and B a safety property. Let
n = (l, a) ∈ N and s ∈ γ(a). If Hn then there exists (l1, s1) −→ · · · −→ (lk, sk), with
(l1, s1) = (l, s) and (lk, sk) ∈ B.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on the derivation of Hn.
Base case: The base case is when Hn is derived by a single application of a
rule. This can only be the h-all-bad rule. (At ﬁrst glance it appears there is a
possibility of using h-P-move if n has no successors, but since s ∈ γ(a), Lemma 2.4
shows this is impossible.) From the premises of h-all-bad and s ∈ γ(a), we have
(l, s) ∈ B. Taking the one-element sequence (l, s) we are done.
Inductive case for h-P-move: From the premises of h-P-move we have ρ(n) =
P . Applying A2, we see that there exists (l′, a′) such that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′), and
there exists s′ ∈ γ(a′) such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). Now, also from the premises of
h-P-move, we see thatH(l′, a′). Applying the induction hypothesis and renumber-
ing, we obtain a sequence (l2, s2), . . . , (lk, sk) such that (l2, s2) −→ · · · −→ (lk, sk),
with (l2, s2) = (l′, s′) and (lk, sk) ∈ B. Set (l1, s1) := (l, s) and we are done.
Inductive case for h-F-move: By the premises of h-F-move there exists n′ =
(l′, a′) such that n abs−−→ n′ and Hn′. Also from the premises of h-F-move we
have ρ(n) = F . This means we can apply A1 to obtain an s′ ∈ γ(a′) such that
(l, s) −→ (l, s′). Applying the induction hypothesis to n′ = (l′, s′) and renumbering,
there exists a sequence (l2, s2), . . . , (lk, sk) such that (l2, s2) −→ · · · −→ (lk, sk), with
(l2, s2) = (l′, s′) and (lk, sk) ∈ B. Set (l1, s1) := (l, s) and we are done.

Corollary 3.4 Falsiﬁcation with sound augmented models. Let M+ be a
sound augmented model, and let B be a safety property. Let (start, a) ∈ N such that
sinit ∈ γ(a). If H(start, a) then B is false. 
The above is all well and good, but how do we obtain a sound augmented model
for a program? Below we present a way to turn any sound over-approximating
model (supporting veriﬁcation only) into a sound augmented model (supporting
falsiﬁcation also). The construction is very easy, and simply assigns all abstract
nodes corresponding to choice edges to player F, and all other nodes to player P.
Augmented models constructed in this way capture precisely the “must informa-
tion” implicitly present in the original over-approximating model: at choice nodes
all transitions are taken, and at other nodes some transition must be taken, as ex-
ecution cannot simply stop. Such models allow, as we shall see, the falsiﬁcation of
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some safety properties, by means of solving an attractor game.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let M be a sound model for a program. We deﬁne the default
augmented model for M to be M+ = (M,ρ) where
ρ(l, a) :=
{
F if E(l) has the form choice : l′ : l′′
P otherwise
For example, the augmented models in Figures 1 and 2 are all default augmented
models. 
Theorem 3.6 Let M be a sound model. Then the default augmented model M+ is
a sound augmented model.
Proof.
Proof of A1: Let ρ((l, a)) = F and s ∈ γ(a). Let also (l′, a′) be such that
(l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′). Since ρ((l, a)) = F , edge E(l) has form choice : l1 : l2 . By H1,
either l1 = l′ or l2 = l′. If l1 = l′ then the choice-1 rule gives us (l, s) −→ (l′, s); on
the other hand if l2 = l′ then the choice-2 rule provides the same conclusion. By
H2, we have a′ = a, whence s ∈ γ(a′). Putting s′ := s we have found, as required,
s′ ∈ γ(a′) such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′).
Proof of A2: Let ρ((l, a)) = P and s ∈ γ(a). By Lemma 2.1 (seriality), there
exists a conﬁguration (l′, s′) such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). By S1 (soundness) there
exists (l′, a′) ∈ N such that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′).

It is in the A2 part of the preceding proof that seriality played its key part.
Theorem 3.3 can also be used to perform “conditional” falsiﬁcations, of the form
“If execution ever reaches node n, then it will proceed to a conﬁguration in B”.
To decide whether Hx for a particular node x (typically start), we simply apply
the three rules for H over and over again, discovering more and more nodes n for
which Hn, until either we have shown Hx, or no more applications of the rules are
possible. This can be viewed as computing, in the underlying two-person game, as
much of the attractor as is needed to determine whether it includes x.
Example 3.7 Using the augmented model in Figure 1 (left) we can prove that
the program reaches the error state, i.e. we can falsify the safety property given
by bad conﬁgurations B := {ERROR} × State. We begin by using the h-all-bad
rule to establish H(ERROR, [x : zero]) and H(ERROR, [x : pos]). This reﬂects the
fact that if execution reaches these nodes then clearly the safety property has been
broken. Now we consider the node (1, [x : pos]), which is a node of player P. We
have shown H for each of its abs−−→-successors, so we can use the h-P-move rule to
get H(1, [x : pos]). This reﬂects the fact that although the abstraction used (here:
sign analysis) cannot tell which way execution goes from the node (1, [x : pos]), it
must go somewhere, and wherever it goes, the safety property will be broken. One
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further application of h-P-move gives us H(start, zero), whence, by Corollary 3.4,
B is false, that is, execution reaches the error state. 
The model in Figure 1 (right) allows a similar proof that ERROR is reached,
but shows that uncertainty over which path execution takes through the program
can be dealt with, as well as uncertainty over the values of the program’s variables.
4 In-depth example
Example 4.1 The program in Figure 2 generates an arbitrary natural number n
and then computes n−1 in y and the integer square root of n in x, that is, ﬁnds an
integer value for x such that x2 ≤ n < (x+ 1)2. The program is instrumented with
a conditional which checks that the correct square root has been calculated, and
transitions to the ERROR state if not. However, we have introduced a “mistake”:
the guard for the square root computation part is the negation of what it should
be.
Figure 2 includes a default augmented model constructed by a simple sign analy-
sis, and this is enough to prove the program faulty. Describing the proof in terms of
the game, Player F (the Falsiﬁer) is in charge of the choice of which natural number
n is generated. If player F plays so as to force a positive n to be generated, this
wins the game; player P still has some choice of moves, because the sign analysis
could not determine whether y becomes zero or positive, but whichever of these is
taken, execution ends up at the ERROR node. 
The preceding example only works because we distinguish F and P nodes, and
use diﬀerent rules for them; if P controlled the choice of n, he could force n = 0
and then ERROR is not reached. The example also illustrates the style in which we
intend to deal with nondeterminism, which is needed to ensure that the program
is tested over all inputs. Instead of using atomic nondeterministic statements such
as havoc (e.g. [13]), we propose to encode them using small control ﬂow graphs
consisting of choice edges and deterministic statements, and then analyse these
with over-approximation in the same way as the rest of the program. The game
structure will take care of making sure that all the possible choices are explored.
When we perform veriﬁcations/falsiﬁcations in HECTOR [5], to which we have
added an implementation of this approach, we put each piece of generating code into
a procedure, which we call a generator procedure, which helps structure the instru-
mentation process. Implementation issues, along with the treatment of procedures,
are discussed in the upcoming thesis [6].
We have also used generator procedures with linked data structures, for example
to generate all possible linked lists, which we use with models we build from a shape
analysis (see [5]). We intend also to experiment with modelling nondeterministic
memory allocation in this way.
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Fig. 2. An example of a faulty program, and a default augmented model which proves that the error state
is reached, thanks to our diﬀering treatment of F and P nodes. See Example 4.1 for details.
5 Incorporation of must information
The PhD thesis [8] proposes the use of mixed transition systems (MTSs) as models
which can both verify and falsify properties of programs. This is achieved by using
two transition relations: a “may” transition relation, which over-approximates and
is like our abs−−→, and a “must” transition relation must−−−→ which under-approximates.
In this section we show that our augmented models can neatly capture all the
must information that is present in a MTS, while:
• keeping the same node structure,
• remaining sound for both veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation, and
• still only needing one transition relation.
This is achieved essentially by changing the player in charge of particular nodes,
and works because of the way we have carefully isolated nondeterminism into the
choice statement, which is used to build generator procedures. We begin by deﬁning
MTSs.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Mixed Transition Systems (MTSs). A Mixed Transition Sys-
tem M † = (N, abs−−→, must−−−→) for a given program consists of an abstract model
M = (N, abs−−→) along with another transition relation must−−−→ ⊆ N × N satisfying
the following healthiness conditions:
M1 If (l, a) must−−−→ (l′, a′) then E(l) must be some edge with l′ as a target.
M2 If (l, a) must−−−→ (l′, a′) and E(l) is a choice edge, then a′ = a. 
N. Charlton, M. Huth / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 223 (2008) 71–8680
We sometimes write M † = (M, must−−−→) to emphasise that the MTS is obtained
from an abstract model M by adding must−−−→ transitions to it. As in [8], our deﬁnition
relaxes the requirement in [12] that all must transitions are also may transitions,
but it also adds M1 and M2 as natural constraints for our program abstractions.
Deﬁnition 5.2 Soundness of MTSs. An MTS M † as above is said to be sound
if M is sound and the following condition holds:
S2 Let (l, a) ∈ N and (l, s) be such that s ∈ γ(a). Let (l, a) must−−−→ (l′, a′). Then
there exists s′ such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′). 
The next theorem, which we establish via a lemma, shows how MTSs can be
used to falsify safety properties.
Lemma 5.3 Let M † be a sound MTS. Let there exist a sequence n1, . . . , nk ∈ N
(where each ni is (li, ai)) such that n1
must−−−→ n2 must−−−→ · · · must−−−→ nk. Let s ∈ γ(a1).
Then there exist s1, . . . , sk ∈ State such that s1 = s, sk ∈ γ(ak) and (l1, s1) −→ . . . −→
(lk, sk).
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. The base case when k = 1 is trivial. For
the inductive case, k > 1, let there exist a sequence n1, . . . , nk ∈ N (where each ni
is (li, ai)) such that n1
must−−−→ n2 must−−−→ · · · must−−−→ nk. Let s ∈ γ(a1).
Applying the induction hypothesis to the preﬁx n1, . . . , nk−1, there exist
s1, . . . , sk−1 such that s1 = s, sk−1 ∈ γ(ak−1) and (l1, s1) −→ . . . −→ (lk−1, sk−1).
Applying S2 to the transition nk−1
must−−−→ nk, there exists (lk, s′) such that
(lk−1, sk−1) −→ (lk, s′) and s′ ∈ γ(ak). Putting sk := s′ we are done. 
Theorem 5.4 Falsiﬁcation with MTSs. Let M † = (N, abs−−→, must−−−→) be a sound
MTS for a program P . Consider a safety property expressed by a set B of bad
conﬁgurations. To falsify B it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a sequence n1, . . . , nk ∈ N with
(i) n1
must−−−→ n2 must−−−→ · · · must−−−→ nk
(ii) n1 = (start, a1) with sinit ∈ γ(a1), and
(iii) nk = (lk, ak), with {lk} × γ(ak) ⊆ B.
Proof. Let M † = (N, abs−−→, must−−−→) be a sound MTS for a program P . Let B be a
set of bad conﬁgurations. Suppose there exists a sequence n1, . . . , nk ∈ N satisfying
conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Theorem 5.4.
Due to (i) and (ii), we can apply the previous lemma (Lemma 5.3) to get a
sequence of states sinit, s2, . . . , sk ∈ State such that (start, sinit) −→ (l2, s2) −→ . . . −→
(lk, sk) and sk ∈ γ(ak). From (iii) we have (lk, sk) ∈ B, i.e. we have found an
execution sequence starting at (start, sinit) and leading to the bad state (lk, sk). 
Next, as promised, we show how to simply construct an augmented model which
neatly captures all the must information from an MTS, while keeping the same node
structure as the underlying over-approximating model, remaining sound for both
veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation, and still only needing one transition relation.
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The construction is simple, diﬀering from the default augmented model in that,
at any abstract node which has a must transition leaving it, we put player F in
charge, and replace the outgoing abs−−→ edges with the provided outgoing must−−−→ edges.
This is sound due to the partial determinism of the concrete semantics −→.
Deﬁnition 5.5 Given an MTS M † = (M, must−−−→) for an abstract model M =
(N, abs−−→), we deﬁne the augmented model incorporating must−−−→ for M to be
M+[ must−−−→] = (N, abs−−→
+
, ρ)
where (listing cases in order of priority):
(l, a) abs−−→
+
(l′, a′) ⇔ (l′, a′) ∈ T (l, a)
T (l, a) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{(l′, a′) | (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′)} if E(l) has the form choice : l1 : l2
{(l′, a′) | (l, a) must−−−→ (l′, a′)} if there exists n′ ∈ N such that n must−−−→ n′
{(l′, a′) | (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′)} otherwise
ρ(l, a) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
F if E(l) has the form choice : l1 : l2
F if there exists n′ ∈ N such that n must−−−→ n′
P otherwise

The following theorem shows that, after incorporating must information, the
augmented model is still sound for both veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation.
Theorem 5.6 Let M † = (M, must−−−→) be a sound MTS. Then M+[ must−−−→] is a sound
augmented model.
Proof.
Proof of H1 and H2: First we must check that abs−−→
+
satisﬁes the healthiness
conditions H1 and H2; this comes easily from the corresponding conditions H1
and H2 for abs−−→, and M1 and M2 for must−−−→.
Proof of S1: Now we must check that (N, abs−−→
+
) is actually a sound model,w
i.e. that it satisﬁes S1. (This part of the proof depends on the determinism of
ordinary program statements.)
Let (l, a) ∈ N and (l, s) be such that s ∈ γ(a). Let (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). If E(l)
has the form choice : l1 : l2 or has no must transitions leaving it, then (l, s) has
the same successors under abs−−→
+
as it does under abs−−→, and the conclusion follows
from the S1 property of (N, abs−−→).
So suppose E(l) doesn’t have the form choice : l1 : l2 , and there exists
n′′ = (l′′, a′′) ∈ N such that n must−−−→ n′′. By deﬁnition of abs−−→
+
we have
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n
abs−−→
+
n′′. By S2, there exists s′′ such that (l, s) −→ (l′′, s′′) and s′′ ∈ γ(a′′). By
Lemma 2.1 (partial determinism), l′ = l′′ and s′ = s′′. Hence, putting a′ := a′′,
we have found as required (l′, a′) ∈ N such that (l, a) abs−−→
+
(l′, a′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′).
Proof of A1: Let ρ((l, a)) = F and s ∈ γ(a). Let (l′, a′) be such that (l, a) abs−−→
+
(l′, a′). There are two situations in which we can have ρ((l, a)) = F .
• The ﬁrst situation is when E(l) has the form choice : l1 : l2 . By H1, either
l1 = l′ or l2 = l′. If l1 = l′ then the choice-1 rule gives us (l, s) −→ (l′, s); on
the other hand if l2 = l′ then the choice-2 rule provides the same conclusion.
By H2, we have a′ = a, whence s ∈ γ(a′). Putting s′ := s we have found, as
required, s′ ∈ γ(a′) such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′).
• The second situation is when E(l) doesn’t have the form choice : l1 : l2 , and
there exists n′′ = (l′′, a′′) ∈ N such that n must−−−→ n′′. By deﬁnition of abs−−→
+
we
have (l, a) must−−−→ (l′, a′) (because here we chose the must edges). By S2, there
exists s′ such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′) and we are done.
Proof of A2: Let ρ((l, a)) = P and s ∈ γ(a). By Lemma 2.1 (seriality), there
exists a conﬁguration (l′, s′) such that (l, s) −→ (l′, s′). By S1 (applied to (N, abs−−→)),
there exists (l′, a′) ∈ N such that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′) and s′ ∈ γ(a′). To ﬁnish,
note that by deﬁnition of abs−−→
+
and the fact that (l, a) abs−−→ (l′, a′), we have
(l, a) abs−−→
+
(l′, a′) (because here we have chosen the ordinary abstract edges).

The next theorem, proved with the aid of the following lemma, conﬁrms that,
as promised, M+[ must−−−→] really does capture all the must information from the MTS
(M, must−−−→).
Lemma 5.7 Let M † = (N, abs−−→, must−−−→) be a sound MTS. Let B ⊆ Locs × State
and let there exist a sequence n1, . . . , nk ∈ N (where each ni is (li, ai)) such that
n1
must−−−→ n2 must−−−→ · · · must−−−→ nk and γ(a1) is nonempty. Let {lk} × γ(ak) ⊆ B. Then
Hn1 with respect to M+[
must−−−→] (the augmented model incorporating must−−−→).
Proof. Write M+[ must−−−→] as (N, abs−−→
+
, ρ). We proceed by induction on k. For the
base case, when k = 1, the condition {lk} × γ(ak) ⊆ B is exactly what is needed to
invoke the h-all-bad rule to obtain Hn1.
For the inductive case, k > 1, let n1, . . . , nk ∈ N (where each ni is (li, ai))
be such that n1
must−−−→ n2 must−−−→ · · · must−−−→ nk and {lk} × γ(ak) ⊆ B and γ(a1) is
nonempty.
The set γ(a1) is nonempty so there exists s1 ∈ γ(a1). By S2, there exists some
s2 in γ(a2) such that (l1, s1) −→ (l2, s2). Therefore γ(a2) is also nonempty, and we
can apply the induction hypothesis to the suﬃx n2, . . . , nk ∈ N , obtaining Hn2.
Because there is a must transition leaving n1 (i.e. the one to n2) it follows from the
deﬁnition of M+[ must−−−→] that ρ(n) = F . We can use the h-F-move rule to complete
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the proof if we can show n1
abs−−→
+
n2.
There are two cases to check.
• In the ﬁrst case, E(l1) has form choice : l′ : l′′ . It follows from M2 that
a1 = a2. From (l1, s1) −→ (l2, s2), using S1, there exists (l2, a′) ∈ N such that
(l1, a1)
abs−−→ (l2, a′). By H2, a′ = a1, and we already know a1 = a2. Thus we have
(l1, a1)
abs−−→ (l2, a2), i.e. n1 abs−−→ n2. Finally, in the deﬁnition of abs−−→
+
we choose
the ordinary abstract edges at n1, so we have n1
abs−−→
+
n2.
• In the second case, E(l1) has some other form, and in the deﬁnition of
abs−−→
+
we choose the must edges at n1. Thus the required n1
abs−−→
+
n2 follows from
n1
must−−−→ n2.

Theorem 5.8 Let P be a program and M † = (M, must−−−→) a sound MTS for P .
Consider any safety property expressed by a set B of bad conﬁgurations. If B is
falsiﬁed by (M, must−−−→) (using Corollary 5.4) then B is also falsiﬁed by the augmented
model M+[ must−−−→] (using Theorem 3.3).
Proof. This follows easily from the previous lemma (Lemma 5.7); just note that
the premises of Theorem 5.4 demand that sinit ∈ γ(a1), and this is what assures the
nonemptiness of γ(a1) needed to invoke the lemma. 
Informally, this theorem says that, for the kinds of safety properties and pro-
grams considered in this paper, it is always worth transforming an MTS into one of
our attractors game before using it for falsiﬁcation: the transformation is easy to
perform and the resulting game falsiﬁes at the very least the same set of properties
as the original MTS, and possibly more.
At ﬁrst glance the reader may ﬁnd Theorem 5.8 odd; since we have isolated
nondeterminism into choice statements, one might think that no useful must infor-
mation can exist for the other statement forms. Such an assessment is incorrect,
however: consider an abstract node (l, a), where E(l) is an ordinary (and thus deter-
ministic) statement, with two must-successors (l′, a1) and (l′, a2). If we have neither
γ(a1) ⊆ γ(a2) nor γ(a1) ⊇ γ(a2) then the must edges are providing useful informa-
tion. Even assuming perfect automated reasoning about the abstraction domain,
it is not in general possible to replace (l′, a1) and (l′, a2) with a single successor
without losing information, because the abstraction domain used need not contain
any a′ such that γ(a′) = γ(a1) ∩ γ(a2).
We end this section with an unresolved question. When incorporating must
information, we have shown that we obtain all the falsiﬁcation power of the MTS
from which the must edges come; we also know that the augmented model remains
sound for both veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation. But it remains to be seen what happens
to the veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation power of the default augmented model when
additional must edges are incorporated; we can contrive situations where this power
increases (as we would hope), decreases or remains unchanged, but do not have a
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feeling for what will most frequently happen in practice.
6 Conclusions and related work
In this paper, we used a two-player attractor game to show that models which only
over-approximate can nevertheless be used to falsify safety properties, that is, with-
out using any under-approximation, feasibility checking or concrete counterexample
search. To make this work, we focused on two properties of programs that are not
accounted for in a conventional treatment of must transitions (e.g. [9]) namely seri-
ality and partial determinism. Through Example 4.1 we demonstrated how and why
our method works. Finally, we showed that if some must transitions are available,
they can be incorporated into our approach very easily. We proved that by doing
this, we obtain in a simple way all the falsiﬁcation power of the must transition
approach, and yet our models remain sound for both veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation,
retain the same node structure and still require only a single transition relation.
Related work
The present paper explores what generalised model checking [2], which eﬀectively
“case splits” on unknown propositions, means in the particular context of checking
safety properties of programs. The existing works closest to ours, as far as we are
aware, are [10] and [16], which also build models which can both verify and falsify
properties.
In [10], which is speciﬁc to predicate abstraction domains, seriality is exploited
but only for conditional statements (as in Figure 1 (right)), and not for ordinary
statements (needed for Figure 1 (left)). For ordinary statements, [10] uses must
transitions to weaker tri-vector states. The “must hyper-transitions” used in [16]
also capture seriality, though this is not the motivation given in [16] for introducing
them; rather, they are proposed as a way to make abstraction reﬁnement monotonic.
Both [10] and [16] require the use of two separate transition relations, whereas we
need only one. Here we handle only safety properties expressed by giving a set
of bad conﬁgurations, whereas [10,16] handle the much more expressive temporal
logic CTL, and additionally address automatic abstraction reﬁnement which we
do not. We emphasise the expected role of generator procedures in our approach,
rather than atomic statements such as havoc, in producing more falsiﬁcations. Our
method subsumes the “choose-free-paths” technique from [15].
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